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In the present study, we analyze the relationship between social cognition 
and language and, specifically, between Theory of Mind (ToM) and syntax. 
We propose a reflection about the importance of understanding this 
relationship especially for future clinical applications. We propose to divide 
the state of the art on the topic into two major strands: the hypothesis of 
dependence and the hypothesis of independence between ToM and syntax. 
 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to present an overview of the main 
hypotheses on the relationship between syntax and ToM. Syntax is the 
component of language that allows a human being to understand and 
construct an infinite number of grammatical sentences from a finite number 
of elements; specifically, it is the linguistic component that deals with the 
study of the principles and processes by which sentences are constructed and 
then how words are composed to form a sentence (Chomsky, 1957). ToM is 
the ability to attribute to ourselves and to others mental states such as desires, 
beliefs, intentions, thoughts and emotions in order to understand, predict, 
interpret and sometimes even influence our own and others' behaviors on the 
basis of such mental states (Baron-Cohen, 1995).  
In order to better understand the relationship between syntax and ToM, 
we analyzed studies on pre-school children with typical development, deaf 
children with deaf signer parents or hearing parents, children with delayed 
language (e.g., children with specific language impairment), children 
diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder, children speaking languages other 
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than English, training studies, and studies on adults with neuropsychological 
dis-orders (e.g., aphasia). 
 
2. The hypothesis of Theory of Mind development dependence 
upon syntax 
When we talk about dependence, we refer to three different ways to 
picture causation: some researchers have speculated that ToM contributes 
actively to the development of language; however, most of the studies 
identify a relationship in the opposite causation, that is to say that ToM owes 
its development to the presence of a good linguistic basis (e.g., De Villiers & 
De Villiers, 2000; Pyers & Senghas, 2009; San Juan & Astington, 2012). A 
third possibility, a bit less investigated, is that the two skills are related to 
each other be-cause both are related to a third missing variable (Hauser, 
Chomsky & Fitch, 2002; Vicari & Adenzato, 2014). 
By analyzing assumptions of the dependence of ToM on language, we 
can observe that most of the studies focus on the dependence of ToM upon 
syntax, which means that we need a previously acquired syntax for the proper 
development of ToM (e.g., De Villiers & De Villiers, 2000; Hollebrandse et 
al., 2008; Kiss & Jakab, 2014). 
Meaningful studies that assume the dependence of ToM upon syntax are 
longitudinal studies (e.g., Astington & Jenkins, 1999; De Villiers & De 
Villiers, 2000; De Villiers & Pyers, 2002) and training studies (e.g., Hale & 
Tager-Flusberg, 2003; Lohmann & Tomasello, 2003). For example, in a 
longitudinal study De Villiers and Pyers (2002) noted that the mastery of the 
syntax for sentential complements was the best predictor of success in ToM 
tasks, and in a training study Hale and Tager-Flusberg (2003) found that the 
acquisition of sentential complements as specific linguistic construction leads 
to improved performance on false belief tasks. 
 
3. The hypothesis of Theory of Mind development independence of 
syntax 
The hypotheses of independence explain how language and ToM are 
related but separated skills, neither of which are necessary nor sufficient for 
each other (e.g., Siegal et al., 2001; Miller, 2004; Siegal & Varley, 2006; 
Willems & Varley, 2010; Lewis et al., 2014). 
According to this hypothesis, grammar has a function of slight 
importance for ToM development even if it is an important source and means 
for the mediation of the conversation. For example, the evidence on aphasic 
patients indicates that explicit grammar ability is not necessary to scaffold 
ToM reasoning (e.g., Ramachandra & Schneider, 2011; Ramachandra & 
Mikajlo, 2013), an hypothesis which is also supported by the studies about 
ToM reasoning in adult patients with damage to the right hemisphere in 
which the results show that the impairment is associated with deficit in ToM 
skills and pragmatic awareness, in the presence of intact grammatical skills 
(Siegal & Varley, 2006). 
 
4. Discussion 
The role of language in ToM is well-recognized but the relative 
contribution of different aspect of language remains debated (e.g. see 
Ruffman et al., 2003; Astington & Baird, 2005). In the present analysis we 
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have focused the attention on syntax, and the emerging picture is rather 
controversial. In our opinion, in order to understand why studies that 
investigated the relationship between syntax and ToM yielded mixed results 
it is important to pay attention to the kind of experimental tasks normally 
used in these studies. In particular, it is worth underlining that ToM tasks 
used in most of the studies we reviewed are not cognitively equivalent and 
they might draw on various mental abilities. Furthermore, even the samples 
studied by different authors involved in this debate are not fully comparable. 
One thing is to discuss the relationship between ToM and syntax in the 
development stages; another is when both functions have already been 
acquired. In the near future would be beneficial a contribution from a 
cognitive neurodevelopmental approach to the matter covering the whole life 
span with the use of converging methodologies, that is, an approach able to 
integrate what we have under-stood so far into a wider and integrated 
framework and able to go beyond the current limits mainly due to the use of 
populations and methods often not comparable.  
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